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Escaping	  from	  the	  Standard	  Story:	  
Why	  The	  Conventional	  Wisdom	  on	  
Prison	   Growth	   Is	   Wrong,	   And	  
Where	  We	  Can	  Go	  From	  Here	  
	  




Whether	  as	  a	  result	  of	  low	  crime	  rates,	  the	  financial	  pressures	  
of	   the	  2008	  credit	   crunch,	  or	  other	   factors,	  policymakers	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  are	  trying	  to	  rein	  or	  even	  reduce	  the	  US	  
incarceration	   rate	   after	   an	   unprecedented	   forty-­‐year	   expan-­‐
sion.	   Unfortunately,	   reforms	   are	   hampered	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  
we	   do	   not	   have	   a	   solid	   empirical	   understanding	   of	   what	  
caused	  the	  explosion	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  fact,	  the	  “Standard	  
Story”	   of	   prison	   growth	   generally	   overemphasizes	   less	   im-­‐
portant	   factors	  and	  overlooks	  more	   important	  ones.	  This	  es-­‐
say	  thus	  does	  two	  things.	  First,	   it	  points	  out	  the	  flaws	  in	  five	  
key	  aspects	  of	  the	  Standard	  Story:	  its	  argument	  that	  the	  War	  
on	  Drugs	   is	  of	  central	   importance,	   that	   trends	   in	  violent	  and	  
property	   crimes	   are	   relatively	   unimportant,	   that	   longer	   sen-­‐
tence	  lengths	  drive	  growth,	  that	  the	  “criminal	  justice	  system”	  
is	   a	   fairly	   coherent	   entity	   advancing	   specific	   goals,	   and	   that	  
the	  “politics	  of	  crime	  control”	   is	  uniquely	  dysfunctional.	  And	  
second,	   it	  argues	  that	  an	  increased	  willingness	  of	  the	  part	  of	  
prosecutors	  to	  file	  charges—a	  causal	  factor	  almost	  complete-­‐
ly	   overlooked	   by	   the	   Standard	   Story—is	   likely	   the	  most	   im-­‐
portant	  force	  behind	  prison	  growth,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  past	  two	  
decades.	  
                                                
*	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  Fordham	  Law	  School.	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The	   past	   four	   decades	   have	  witnessed	   an	   unprecedented	   surge	   in	  
the	  US	  incarceration	  rate.	  Stable	  for	  nearly	  fifty	  years	  at	  about	  100	  per	  
100,000,	   it	   started	  surging	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s	  to	  nearly	  500	  per	  100,000	  
today.	  It	  is	  an	  explosion	  unprecedented	  here	  or	  abroad:	  with	  only	  5%	  of	  
the	  world’s	   population,	   the	   US	   is	   now	   home	   to	  more	   than	   20%	   of	   its	  
prisoners.	  
But	  relatively	  low	  crime	  rates	  and	  tight	  state	  budgets	  have	  led	  to	  a	  
fairly	  bipartisan	  desire	   to	   reduce	  the	  scale	  of	  US	   incarceration.	  Reform	  
efforts,	  however,	  are	  hampered	  by	  a	  serious	  limitation,	  namely	  that	  we	  
don’t	  really	  understand	  what	  caused	  this	  growth	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Actu-­‐
ally,	  the	  problem	  is	  worse:	  policymakers,	  journalists,	  academics,	  and	  the	  
wider	  public	  all	  generally	  accept	  a	  conventional	  wisdom—what	  I	  will	  call	  
the	   “Standard	   Story”—that	   is	   simply	   incorrect.	   It	   is	   a	   situation	   worse	  
than	  ignorance.	  
In	   this	   short	   essay	   I	   want	   to	   correct	   several	   of	   the	   more	   durable	  
myths	   or	  misconceptions	   that	   are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Standard	   Story,	  
focusing	  on	   five	  problematic	  claims	   in	  particular:	   (1)	   the	  War	  on	  Drugs	  
drives	  prison	  growth,	  (2)	  trends	  in	  violent	  and	  property	  crimes	  are	  rela-­‐
tively	   unimportant,	   (3)	   longer	   sentences	   drive	   prison	   growth,	   (4)	   the	  
“criminal	   justice	   system”	   is	   a	   fairly	   coherent	   entity	   with	   identifiable	  
goals,	  and	  (5)	  the	  politics	  of	  crime	  are	  uniquely	  dysfunctional.	  There	  are	  
other	  aspects	  of	  the	  Standard	  Story	  that	  are	  also	  empirically	  problemat-­‐
ic—such	  as	  claims	  tying	  prison	  growth	  to	  private	  prisons	  or	  to	  increased	  
parole	  violations	   (particularly	   technical	  violations)	  1—but	   these	   five	  are	  
                                                
1	  According	  to	  Bureau	  of	  Justice	  Statistics,	  only	  about	  8%	  of	  state	  prisoners	  are	  
held	  in	  private	  prisons.	  And	  while	  parole	  violations	  have	  gone	  up,	  so	  too	  have	  
parole	  releases,	  thanks	  to	  rising	  prison	  populations.	  Parole	  releases	  and	  parole	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among	   the	  most	   important	  claims,	  and	  my	  space	  here	   is	   limited.	  After	  
pointing	  out	  the	  deep	  flaws	  with	  these	  five	  claims,	  I	  will	  highlight	  some	  
of	  the	  more	  empirically	  plausible	  explanations,	  emphasizing	  in	  particular	  
the	  importance	  of	  prosecutors	  and	  their	  willingness	  to	  file	  felony	  charg-­‐
es.	  
	  
Five	  Problematic	  Explanations	  of	  Prison	  Growth	  
	  
The	   Standard	   Story	   comes	   in	   many	   different	   forms,	   but	   across	   a	  
wide	   range	   of	   commentators	   a	   fairly	   consistent—and	   flawed—story	  
emerges.	  Here	  I	  consider	  five	  common,	  incorrect	  aspects	  of	  that	  Story.	  
	  
The	  War	  on	  Drugs.	  This	   is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  common	  and	  durable	  
explanation.	   It	   is	   also	   easy	   to	   dismantle.	   Figure	   1	   plots	   the	   percent	   of	  
state	  prisoners	  over	  time	  whose	  primary	  offense	  was	  a	  drug	  crime.2	  Yes,	  
the	  percent	  rises	  sharply	  from	  1980	  to	  1990,	  when	  it	  peaks	  at	  22%.	  But	  
that’s	  only	  22%:	  nearly	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  all	  state	  prisoners	  in	  1990	  were	  not	  
drug	  offenders.3	  By	  2010	  the	  percent	  of	  state	  prisoners	  serving	  time	  for	  
drug	  offenses	  was	  down	  to	  just	  over	  17%.	  	  
                                                                                                         
violations	  move	   in	   relative	   sync	   (with	   states	   releasing	  more	   than	   they	   violate	  
back),	   suggesting	   that	   parole	   violations	   are	   less	   the	   cause	   of	   but	   more	   the	  
symptom	  of	  prison	  growth.	  See	  John	  F.	  Pfaff,	  The	  Myths	  and	  Realities	  of	  Correc-­‐
tional	  Severity:	  Evidence	   from	  the	  National	  Corrections	  Reporting	  Program,	  13	  
AM.	  L.	  &	  ECON.	  REV.	  491	  (2011).	  
2	  The	   national	   statistics	   on	   imprisonment	   prioritize	   offenses,	   ranking	   violent	  
ahead	   of	   property	   and	   property	   ahead	   of	   drugs.	   So	   someone	   sentenced	   for	  
arson	  and	  drug	  possession	  would	  appear	  just	  as	  a	  “violent	  offender.”	  
3	  About	  half	  of	   all	   federal	  prisoners	  are	   serving	   time	   for	  drug	  offenses	  due	   to	  
the	  federal	  system’s	  limited	  jurisdiction,	  but	  only	  about	  12%	  of	  all	  prisoners	  are	  
federal	   inmates.	   So	   adding	   in	   the	   federal	   system	   raises	   the	   percentages	   by	  
about	  five	  percentage	  points,	  not	  enough	  to	  change	  the	  qualitative	  story	  here.	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The	  relative	  unimportance	  of	  drug	  incarcerations	  can	  be	  illuminated	  
even	   more	   strikingly.	   Between	   1980	   and	   2009,	   state	   prisons	   added	  
1,086,200	   prisoners,	   as	   the	   prison	   population	   rose	   from	   294,000	   to	  
1,380,200.	   This	   increase	   consisted	   of	   551,000	  more	   violent	   offenders,	  
171,900	  more	  property	  offenders,	  and	  only	  223,000	  more	  drug	  offend-­‐
ers	   (with	   the	   rest	   committing	   public-­‐order	   and	   other	   miscellaneous	  
crimes).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  increase	  in	  drug	  incarcerations	  explains	  on-­‐
ly	  21%	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  state	  prison	  populations.4	  The	  increase	  in	  violent	  
offenders	   alone	  explains	  51%—more	   than	  half—of	   the	  overall	   growth,	  
and	   that	   in	   violent	   and	  property	  offenders	   explains	   67%.	  When	   some-­‐
one	  like	  Michelle	  Alexander	  argues	   in	  The	  New	  Jim	  Crow	   that	  drugs	   in-­‐
                                                













1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Note: Data from the National Prisoner Statistics
1980 - 2008
Fig. 1: Percent of Prisoners Serving Drug Sentences
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carcerations	  are	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  prison	  growth	  she	  is	  simply,	  cat-­‐
egorically	  wrong.5	  
That	  said,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  war	  on	  drugs	  could	  have	  important	  
indirect	  effects.	   First,	   drug	   arrests	  may	  not	   result	   in	   incarceration,	   but	  
they	  can	  disrupt	  the	  offender’s	   life	  (relationships,	  employment,	  etc.)	   in	  
ways	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  future	  criminality:	  a	  future	  burglary	  or	  aggravated	  
assault	  could	  be	  the	  product	  in	  part	  of	  the	  social	  disruption	  from	  a	  prior	  
drug	  arrest.	  Second,	  drug	  arrests	  and	  convictions	  increase	  a	  defendant’s	  
criminal	  history,	   resulting	   in	   tougher	   sanctions	  or	   treatment	   for	   future	  
non-­‐drug	   offenses.6	  Third,	   prohibition	   itself	   can	   lead	   to	   violence	   and	  
other	  crimes,	  whether	  by	  destabilizing	  drug	  markets,	  by	   increasing	   the	  
returns	  on	  illegal	  activity,	  by	  making	  it	  harder	  to	  treat	  drug	  addiction	  as	  
a	  public	  health	  problem	  instead	  of	  a	  criminal	  one,	  etc.	  	  
The	  policy	   implications	   here	   are	   clear.	   Reducing	   the	   admissions	   of	  
drug	   offenders	   will	   not	   meaningfully	   reduce	   prison	   populations.	   Ad-­‐
dressing	  the	  collateral	  costs	  of	  the	  war	  on	  drugs—such	  as	  longer	  crimi-­‐
nal	  records	  or	  the	  social	  destabilization	  of	  arrest—may	  be	  more	  produc-­‐
tive.	  But	  it	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  meaningful	  reform	  must	  look	  at	  how	  
we	  treat	  violent	  and	  property	  offenders,	  to	  whom	  I	  turn	  now.	  	  
	  
The	  Importance	  of	  Violent	  and	  Property	  Crimes.	  One	  surprising	  as-­‐
pect	  of	  the	  Standard	  Story	  is	  that	  it	  downplays	  the	  impact	  of	  violent	  and	  
property	  crime	  trends	  on	  incarceration	  rates.	  Its	  insistence	  that	  the	  war	  
                                                
5	  This	   is	   not	   a	   strawman	   argument,	   nor	   an	   overstatement	   of	   what	   she	   says:	  
“The	  impact	  of	  the	  drug	  war	  has	  been	  astounding.	  In	  less	  than	  thirty	  years,	  the	  
U.S.	  penal	  population	  exploded	   from	  around	  300,000	   to	  more	   than	  2	  million,	  
with	  drug	  convictions	  accounting	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  increase.”	  Michelle	  Alex-­‐
ander,	  The	  New	  Jim	  Crow	  6	  (2012)	  (emphasis	  added).	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  by	  now	  
that	  this	  assertion	  is	  fundamentally,	  indeed	  distressingly,	  incorrect.	  
6	  Some	  preliminary	  results	  from	  the	  1997	  and	  2004	  waves	  of	  the	  National	  Sur-­‐
vey	  of	  Inmates	  in	  State	  and	  Federal	  Correctional	  Institutions,	  however,	  cautions	  
against	  putting	  too	  much	  weight	  on	  this	  theory	  as	  well.	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on	  drugs	   is	   the	  primary	  engine	  of	  prison	  growth	  surely	  explains	   this	   to	  
some	  extent.	  Yet	  this	  is	  a	  serious	  error	  in	  the	  Standard	  Story’s	  account.	  
Figure	  2	  plots	  violent	  and	  property	  crime	  rates	  since	  1960.	  Between	  
1960	   and	   1991,	   violent	   crime	   grows	   by	   371%	   and	   property	   crime	   by	  
198%	   (from	  a	  baseline	   ten	   times	   as	   high).	   Like	   the	   subsequent	   expan-­‐
sion	  in	  prison	  populations,	  this	  was	  an	  historically	  unprecedented	  explo-­‐
sion	  in	  crime.	  Such	  soaring	  criminality	  surely	  changed	  people’s	  attitudes	  
towards	  punishment,	  but	  it	  also	  likely	  had	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  incarcera-­‐
tion	  level.	  Empirically	  estimating	  the	  impact	  of	  crime	  on	  incarceration	  is	  
actually	   quite	   tricky,	  7	  but	   one	   of	   the	   more	   sophisticated—albeit	   still	  
quite	  problematic—estimates	  suggests	  that	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  crime	  may	  
lead	   to	   an	   approximately	   1%	   increase	   in	   incarceration.8	  If	   so,	   rising	  
crime	  explains	  half	  the	  prison	  growth	  up	  through	  1991.	  Of	  course,	  that	  
means	  other	   factors	  explain	   the	  other	  half,	  but	   these	   results	  nonethe-­‐
less	  place	  changes	  in	  violent	  and	  property	  crime	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  changes	  
in	  incarceration.	  
                                                
7	  Perhaps	  another	  reason	  the	  Standard	  Story	  downplays	  the	  role	  of	  violent	  and	  
property	   crime	   comes	   from	   the	   trends	   in	   Figure	   2.	   Prison	   populations	   grew	  
when	  crime	  rates	  were	  rising	  (1960	  to	  1980,	  1984	  to	  1991),	  falling	  (1991	  to	  the	  
present),	  and	  flat	  (1980	  -­‐	  1984),	  suggesting	  that	  prison	  populations	  grew	  inde-­‐
pendently	  of	  crime	  rates.	  Yet	  simple	  correlations	  like	  these	  can	  be	  deceptive.	  
8	  Yair	  Listokin,	  Does	  More	  Crime	  Mean	  More	  Prisoners?	  An	  Instrumental	  Varia-­‐
ble	  Approach,	  46	   J.	  L.	  &	  ECON.	  181	   (2003).	  The	  concerns	  with	  Listokin’s	   results	  
are	  technical	  in	  nature:	  Listokin	  uses	  abortion	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  crime,	  which	  
requires	  abortion	  to	  be	  otherwise	  uncorrelated	  with	  incarceration.	  This	  is	  likely	  
not	  true	  since,	  for	  example,	  increased	  abortion	  could	  free	  up	  female	  labor	  sup-­‐
ply	   leading	  to	  higher	   tax	  returns,	  higher	  state	  revenue,	  and	  thus	  an	   increased	  
willingness	  to	   incarcerate.	  The	  likely	  absence	  of	  strict	  exogeneity	  dictates	  that	  
we	  treat	  these	  results	  with	  some	  caution.	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In	   fact,	  Figure	  2	  may	  actually	  undersell	   the	  psychological	   impact	  of	  
the	  crime	  boom	  of	  1960	  to	  1991.	  Figure	  3	  provides	  an	  alternate	  version	  
of	  the	  US	  incarceration	  rate,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  prisoners	  per	  person,	  but	  in	  
terms	  of	  prisoners	  per	  crime;	  call	  this	  the	  “effective”	  incarceration	  rate.	  
What	   is	   striking	   is	   the	   significant	  decline	   in	   the	   effective	   incarceration	  
rate	  from	  1960	  to	  1980:	  as	  crime	  rates	  soared,	  the	  incarceration	  rate—
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Note: Data from the Uniform Crime Report and National Prisoner Statistics
1960 - 2010
Fig. 2: Violent and Property Crime Rates
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Whether	   the	   decline	   in	   effective	   incarceration	   was	   good	   policy	   is	  
immaterial.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  effective	  incarceration	  would	  
have	  led	  to	  more	  crime,	  or	  that	  no	  reasonable	  increase	  in	  incarceration	  
could	   counteract	   the	   broad	   social	   and	   demographic	   upheavals	   that	  
pushed	  up	   crime	   in	   the	  1960s.	  But	  what	  may	   really	  matter	   is	   that	   the	  
Baby	  Boomers—a	   large,	  politically	  powerful	  bloc	  of	   voters—saw	  crime	  
soar	  while	  prison	  populations	   fell	   and	   thought	  a	   causal	   connection	  ex-­‐
isted.	  And	  this	  perception,	  whatever	  the	  true	  causal	  relationship,	   likely	  
influences	  the	  politics	  of	  punishment	  to	  this	  day.	  
	  
The	  (un)importance	  of	  longer	  sentences.	  Another	  core	  argument	  of	  
the	  Standard	  Story	  is	  that	  longer	  sentences	  have	  driven	  up	  prison	  popu-­‐
lations.	  We	   are,	   according	   to	   some	   leading	   criminologists,	   in	   a	   “throw	  
away	  the	  key”	  era.	  Yet	  despite	  anecdotes	  of	  bracingly	  long	  sentences	  for	  
relatively	  minor	   offenses,	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   time	   served	   has	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Note: Data from the Uniform Crime Report and National Prisoner Statistics
1960 - 2010
Fig. 3: Viol. and Prop. Crime Rates Per 1,000 Prisoners
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served	   stable,	   but	   at	   least	   for	   many	   Northern	   states	   (which	   provide	  
more	  reliable	  data),	  it	  is	  surprisingly	  short:	  median	  sentence	  lengths	  are	  
on	  the	  order	  of	  two	  to	  four	  years,	  with	  three-­‐fourths	  of	  all	   inmates	  re-­‐
leased	  in	  about	  six	  to	  eight	  years.	  Two	  or	  six	  years	  in	  a	  state	  prison	  is	  a	  
serious	  sanction,	  but	  such	  sentences	  are	  not	  throw-­‐away-­‐the-­‐key	  long.	  
Figure	   4	   provides	   intuitive	   evidence	   that	   sentence	   length	   has	   not	  
grown	  noticeably	  over	  time.	  All	  Figure	  4	  plots	  is	  the	  total	  annual	  number	  
of	  admissions	  to	  and	  releases	  from	  state	  prisons.	  Were	  sentence	  lengths	  
growing	   systematically	   tougher,	  we	   should	   expect	   releases	   to	   grow	   at	  
an	   increasingly	   flatter	   rate	   relative	   to	   admissions.	   And	   while	   there	   is	  
some	  such	  flattening	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  period	  the	  
two	   lines	   track	   each	   other	   closely—and	   they	   even	   converge	   in	   the	  
2000s.	  More	  rigorous	  studies	  using	  various	  forms	  of	  inmate-­‐	  and	  state-­‐
level	  data	  appear	  to	  confirm	  this	  intuition.9	  
                                                
9	  Pfaff,	  The	  Myths	  and	  Realities	  of	  Correctional	  Severity,	   supra	  note	  1;	   John	  F.	  
Pfaff,	  The	  Durability	  of	  Prison	  Populations,	  2010	  U.	  CHI.	  LEGAL	  F.	  73	  (2010);	  and	  
John	  F.	  Pfaff,	  The	  Centrality	  of	  Prosecutors	  to	  Prison	  Growth:	  An	  Empirical	  Anal-­‐
ysis	  (unpublished	  manuscript,	  2014).	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This	   is	  an	  admittedly	  bold	  claim,	  and	  I	  want	  to	  note	  a	  few	  reserva-­‐
tions.	   First,	   that	   time	   served	   has	   been	   stable	   does	   not	  mean	   tougher	  
sentencing	  laws	  are	  irrelevant.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  at	  least	  since	  the	  
early	  1990s	  the	  primary	  engine	  of	  prison	  growth	  has	  been	  an	  increased	  
willingness	   on	   the	  part	   of	   prosecutors	   to	   file	   felony	   charges.	   By	   giving	  
prosecutors	   bigger	   hammers	   to	   wield	   during	   the	   plea	   bargaining	   pro-­‐
cess,	  tougher	  sentencing	   laws	  may	  enable	  prosecutors	  to	  extract	  guilty	  
pleas	  more	  quickly	  from	  defendants	  (by	  offering	  not	  to	  use	  the	  tougher	  
law).	  Thus	  convicted	  defendants	  may	  serve	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time	  as	  
before,	  but	  more	  defendants	  plead	  out	  (rather	  than,	  say,	  risking	  a	  trial	  
or	  having	  their	  cases	  dismissed	  or	  knocked	  down	  to	  a	  misdemeanor).	  
Second,	   admissions	   have	   been	   rising	   during	   a	   time	   of	   declining	  
crime,	  which	  means	  that	  states	  must	  be	  admitting	  increasingly	  marginal	  
offenders.	   If	   so,	  perhaps	  we	   should	  have	  expected	   time	  served	   to	   fall,	  
not	  stay	  flat.	  That	  time	  served	  has	  remained	  stable	  could	  reflect	  that	  we	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Fig. 4: Admissions and Releases from State Prisons
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Tests	  for	  this	  effect	  seem	  to	  confirm	  that	  it	  is	  present,	  but	  not	  necessari-­‐
ly	  that	  it	  is	  particularly	  strong.	  
	  
The	  criminal	  justice	  system	  is	  not	  a	  system.	  The	  Standard	  Story	  also	  
treats	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  like	  some	  sort	  of	  coherent	  entity	  with	  
defined	  goals;	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  posits	  that	  those	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  po-­‐
litical	   hierarchy—governors,	   presidents,	   political	   parties—use	   “the	   sys-­‐
tem”	  to	  accomplish	  certain	  objectives,	  such	  as	  reducing	  crime	  or	  regu-­‐
lating	   and	   controlling	   minority	   populations.	   In	   fact,	   this	   is	   a	   common	  
view	  of	  criminal	  justice	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  research	  and	  policy.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  
deeply	  flawed	  one.	  
The	  criminal	  justice	  system	  is	  not	  a	  “system”	  at	  all,	  and	  treating	  it	  as	  
such	  can	   lead	  analysts	   to	  overlook	   important	   causes	  of	  prison	  growth.	  
This	   alleged	   “system”	   is	   actually	   a	   poorly	   thought	   out,	   sprawling	   mé-­‐
lange	  of	  competing	  institutions	  with	  different	  constituencies	  and	  incen-­‐
tives,	  and	  which	  at	  times	  do	  not	  work	  well	  together.	  It	  consists	  of	  local	  
police,	  county	  district	  attorneys,	  county	  or	  state	  judges	  (who	  are	  either	  
appointed	   or	   elected,	   and	   if	   elected	   are	   chosen	   in	   partisan	   or	   non-­‐
partisan	  elections),	  state-­‐level	  governors	  and	  parole	  boards,	  and	  hybrid	  
state	  legislators	  (who	  hold	  state-­‐level	  office	  but	  often	  represent	  hyper-­‐
local	   districts),	   not	   to	   mention	   various	   federal	   bureaucracies,	   county	  
sheriffs,	  regional	  task	  forces,	  state	  sentencing	  commissions,	  and	  so	  on.	  
And	  not	  only	  is	  authority	  divided	  across	  these	  actors,	  but	  there	  is	  often	  
no	  clear	  logic	  to	  why	  authority	  is	  divided	  the	  way	  it	  is.	  
Consider	  one	   clear	   example	  of	   a	   poorly-­‐reasoned	  allocation	  of	   au-­‐
thority	  and	  its	  costs.	  Jails	  and	  probation	  offices	  are	  funded	  by	  counties,	  
prisons	   by	   states.	   This	   creates	   a	   significant	   moral	   hazard	   problem	   for	  
county	  prosecutors:	  their	  constituents	  don’t	  pay	  the	  full	  cost	  of	  the	  fel-­‐
ony	   convictions	   they	   secure,	   although	   the	   prosecutors	   reap	   the	   full	  
tough-­‐on-­‐crime	  political	  benefits.	  In	  fact,	  prosecutors	  are	  incentivized	  to	  
charge	  borderline	  cases	  as	  felonies,	  since	  misdemeanors	  resulting	  in	  jail	  
or	   probation	   accrue	   less	   political	   benefit	  and	   increase	   county	   costs.	   A	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model	   that	   treats	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system	  as	   a	   coherent	   entity	  will	  
miss	  such	  moral	  hazard	  issues—which	  is	  exactly	  the	  trap	  into	  which	  the	  
Standard	  Story	  falls.	  
By	   ignoring	   these	   institutional	   factors,	   the	   Standard	   Story	   fails	   to	  
identify	  who	   is	  driving	  prison	  growth:	  are	  police	  arresting	  more	  offend-­‐
ers,	  district	  attorneys	  charging	  more,	   judges	  convicting	  and	  sentencing	  
more,	   judges	   (or	   legislators)	   sentencing	   them	   to	   longer	   sentences,	   or,	  
say,	  parole	  officers	  restricting	  releases?	  The	  Standard	  Story	  glosses	  over	  
these	  questions	  and	  generally	  relies	  on	  broad	  state-­‐	  or	  federal-­‐level	  dis-­‐
cussions.	  This	  oversight	  imposes	  two	  serious	  costs.	  
First,	  and	  more	  technically,	  non-­‐institutional	  empirical	  models	  yield	  
relatively	  uninformative	  results,	  even	  if	  the	  models	  are	  methodological-­‐
ly	  sound	  (which	  they	  almost	  never	  are).10	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  if	  a	  study	  
reports	  that	  a	  1%	  increase	  in	  young	  black	  men	  in	  a	  state	  leads	  to	  a	  1.2%	  
increase	  in	  the	  prison	  population?	  Is	  it	  because	  police	  are	  biased?	  DAs?	  
judges?	  And	   in	  urban	  counties?	  rural	  ones?	  or	  high-­‐crime	  rural	  or	   low-­‐
crime	  urban?	  A	  state-­‐level	  model	  that	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  various	  
institutional	  actors	  involved	  simply	  yields	  an	  uninterpretable	  average	  of	  
all	   sorts	   of	   local	   effects,	   and	   there	   is	   absolutely	   no	   reason	   to	   assume	  
that	   the	  effect	   is	   the	  same	  across	  all	   institutions,	  or	  across	  all	   types	  of	  
counties.	  
Second,	  and	  more	  significantly,	  non-­‐institutional	  models	  provide	  lit-­‐
tle	   insight	   into	  where	   to	   target	   reforms.	   For	   example,	   without	   under-­‐
standing	  who	  is	  driving	  prison	  growth,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  important	  it	  is	  to	  
revise	  state	  sentencing	  laws.	  Consider	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  punishment	  
in	   New	   York	   State.	   The	   Rockefeller	   Drug	   Laws	   (RDLs)	   were	   passed	   in	  
1973,	   yet	   the	  percent	  of	   drug	  offenders	   in	  New	  York	   State	  prisons	   re-­‐
mained	   flat	  or	   fell	   until	   1984.	  County	  DAs	   simply	   ignored	   the	  RDLs	   for	  
                                                
10	  I	   point	   out	   the	   substantial	   methodological	   flaws	   with	   almost	   all	   empirical	  
papers	  on	  prison	  growth	  in	  John	  F.	  Pfaff,	  The	  Empirics	  of	  Prison	  Growth:	  A	  Criti-­‐
cal	  Review	  and	  Path	  Forward,	  98	  J.	  CRIM.	  L.	  &	  CRIMINOLOGY	  547	  (2008).	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over	   a	   decade,	   since	   whatever	   national-­‐level	   politics	   inspired	   Nelson	  
Rockefeller	  to	  advocate	  for	  them	  didn’t	  matter	  at	  their	   local	   level.	  And	  
then	  drug	   incarcerations	  started	   to	  decline	  steady	   from	  1997	  on,	  even	  
though	  the	  legislature	  did	  not	  amend	  the	  RDLs	  until	  2004	  (weakly)	  and	  
2009	  (more	  seriously).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  county	  DAs	  also	  stopped	  rely-­‐
ing	  on	  the	  RDLs	  well	  before	  Albany	  got	  around	  to	  modifying	  them.11	  	  
In	  fact,	  in	  a	  recent	  paper	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  at	  least	  since	  1994,	  the	  
primary	   force	   behind	   prison	   expansion	   has	   been	   an	   increased	  willing-­‐
ness	   on	   the	   part	   of	   district	   attorneys	   to	   file	   felony	   charges:	   crime	   is	  
down,	   arrests	  per	   crime	  are	   generally	   flat	  or	   falling,	   prison	  admissions	  
per	   felony	   case	   are	   flat,	   as	   is	   time	   served,	   but	   filings	   per	   arrest	   have	  
soared.12	  These	   results	   indicate,	   then,	   that	   reforms	   targeting	   prosecu-­‐
tors	   are	   more	   important	   than	   those	   looking	   at	   legislators,	   or	   at	   least	  
that	   legislative	   reforms	   are	   important	   only	   insofar	   as	   they	   alter	   how	  
prosecutors—over	   whom	   legislators	   have	   no	   direct	   authority—
behave.13	  
Moreover,	  this	  institutional	  approach	  demonstrates	  that	  we	  need	  to	  
study	   punishment	   at	   the	   county	   level,	   not	   the	   state	   or	   federal,	   since	  	  
district	  attorneys	  are	  county	  officials	  who	  respond	  to	  county	  incentives.	  
And	   once	   we	   start	   looking	   at	   counties,	   interesting	   features	   that	   the	  
Standard	   Story	   simply	   cannot	   detect	   emerge.	   One,	   obviously,	   is	   the	  
moral	  hazard	  problem	  noted	  above.	  Another	  is	  that	  counties	  can	  differ	  
in	  systematic	  ways.	  New	  York	  State,	  for	  example,	  has	  witnessed	  a	  long-­‐
running	  decline	  in	  both	  its	  overall	  prison	  population	  and	  the	  percent	  of	  
                                                
11	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  RDLs	  were	  not	  immaterial:	  local	  DAs	  could	  not	  have	  been	  as	  
harsh	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  had	  the	  legislature	  not	  given	  them	  that	  option.	  
12	  Pfaff,	  The	  Centrality	  of	  Prosecutors	  to	  Prison	  Growth,	  supra	  note	  9.	  
13	  Other	  examples	  of	  these	  sorts	  of	  agency	  problems	  abound.	  Dan	  Richman,	  for	  
example,	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   New	   Orleans	   Police	   Department	   effectively	  
thwarted	  the	  New	  Orleans’	  DA’s	  efforts	  to	  avoid	  pleading	  out	  cases	  by	  refusing	  
to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  its	  investigations,	  and	  thus	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  cases	  
the	   DA’s	   office	   could	   mount.	   See	   Daniel	   Richman,	   Institutional	   Coordination	  
and	  Sentencing	  Reform,	  84	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  2055	  (2006).	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inmates	  serving	  time	  for	  drug	  offenses.	  Both	  declines	  are	  due	  primarily	  
to	  New	  York	  City:	  while	  the	  City’s	  five	  counties	  have	  been	  sending	  fewer	  
total	   people	   and	   relatively	   fewer	   drug	   offenders	   to	   prison,	   the	   less-­‐
urban	  counties	  of	  the	  state	  have	  been	  doing	  the	  opposite.	  Other	  studies	  
have	   yielded	   similar	   rural-­‐urban	   distinctions.	   These	   results	   raise	   inter-­‐
esting	  questions	  about	  how	  to	  structure	  and	  design	  reforms	  that	  state-­‐
level	  analyses	  cannot	  help	  but	  miss.	  
Of	   course,	  we	   don’t	  want	   to	   overstate	   the	   disaggregate	   nature	   of	  
criminal	  justice	  in	  the	  US.	  While	  police	  chiefs,	  district	  attorneys,	  judges,	  
and	  governors	  are	  all	  relatively	  autonomous	  and	  responsive	  to	  different	  
constituencies,	   they	  also	  all	   still	   read	  the	  same	  op-­‐eds	   in	   the	  same	  pa-­‐
pers	  and	  are	  buffeted	  by	  the	  same	  broad	  cultural	  winds.	  Thus	  they	  are	  
all	   likely	   influenced	  by,	   say,	   the	   rise	  of	   the	  “nothing	  works”	  attitude	   in	  
the	   1970s	   or	   the	   increased	   interest	   in	   re-­‐entry	   or	   problem-­‐solving	   ap-­‐
proaches	  today.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  likely	  respond	  to	  these	  changes	  
differently,	  and	  any	  model	  of	  criminal	  justice	  outcomes	  that	  fails	  to	  ac-­‐
count	  for	  the	  diffuse	  nature	  of	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  will	  miss	  im-­‐
portant	  explanations	  for	  what	  is	  happening.	  	  
	  
The	  “politics”	  of	  crime	  are	  not	  that	  unique.	  The	  final	  erroneous	  as-­‐
pect	  of	  the	  Standard	  Story	  that	   I	  want	  to	  address	   is	   its	  broad	  assertion	  
that	   the	   politics	   of	   criminal	   justice	   are	   uniquely	   dysfunctional.	   It	   is	   an	  
admittedly	  intuitive	  claim:	  while	  most	  policy	  issues	  have	  clearly	  defined	  
antagonistic	   sides—labor	  vs.	  management,	  greens	  vs.	   industry,	  pro-­‐life	  
vs.	   pro-­‐choice—there	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   anyone	   to	   counter	   the	  
“tough	  on	  crime”	  side.	  Furthermore,	  numerous	  criminologists	  and	  soci-­‐
ologists	  have	  argued	  that	  crime	  control	  is	  a	  uniquely	  effective	  election-­‐
eering	  topic	  in	  today’s	  political	  environment,	  leading	  politicians	  to	  focus	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on	  it	  to	  a	  disproportionate	  degree.14	  Taken	  together,	  these	  observations	  
suggest	  we	  should	  see	  a	  one-­‐way	  ratchet	  of	  ever-­‐tougher	  crime	  policies.	  
And	  it	  is	  true	  that	  politicians	  have	  generally	  not	  rolled	  back	  criminal	  
statutes	  or	  weakened	  sentencing	  laws.	  Yet	  the	  story	  is	  more	  complicat-­‐
ed	  than	  that.	  Consider	  Figure	  5,	  which	  plots	  correctional	  spending	  as	  a	  
share	   of	   state	   budget	   outlays.	   Correction’s	   share	   of	   the	   budget	   rises	  
from	   the	   1970s	   through	   the	   early	   1990s—which	   coincides	   with	   the	  
crime	   boom—but	   then	   remains	   relatively	   flat	   during	   from	   the	   mid-­‐
1990s	   onward.	   In	   other	   words,	   once	   crime	   leveled	   out	   in	   the	   early	  
1990s,	  so	  too	  did	  relative	  correctional	  spending.	  	  
	  
                                                
14	  Surprisingly,	   these	   researchers	   rarely	   explain	   why	   crime	   has	   been	   such	   a	  
powerful	  electoral	  topic,	  or	  at	   least	  why	  politicians	  have	  favored	   it	  over	  other	  
potential	  issues.	  A	  likely	  explanation	  is	  that	  our	  high	  rates	  of	  crime	  itself	  made	  
crime	   control	   a	   salient	   political	   issue,	   but	   as	   noted	   above	   the	   Standard	   Story	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It	   is	   true	   that	   absolute	   correctional	   spending	   rose	   steadily	   during	  
the	  1990s	  and	  2000s,	  from	  almost	  $20	  billion	  in	  1991	  to	  nearly	  $50	  bil-­‐
lion	   in	   2008	   (a	   159%	   nominal	   increase,	   although	   only	   a	   63%	   real	   in-­‐
crease,	   and	  only	   a	   35%	   real	   increase	  per	   capita).	   But	   look	   at	   Figure	  6,	  
which	  plots	  real	  per-­‐capita	  state	  revenues	  and	  expenditures	  from	  1952	  
to	  2008:	  state	  fiscal	  capacity	  grew	  steadily	  over	  that	  time,	  and	  spending	  
moved	  in	  lockstep	  with	  revenues.	  States	  were	  spending	  more	  on	  every-­‐
thing,	   including	   corrections.	   In	   fact,	   for	   all	   the	   talk	   of	   “crowding	   out,”	  
correctional	  spending	  is	  generally	  positively	  correlated	  with	  spending	  on	  
welfare,	  education,	  transportation,	  etc.15	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  spending	  on	  corrections	  ultimately	  does	  not	  appear	  
to	  be	  as	  exceptional	  as	  it	  seems	  at	  first	  blush.	  Once	  crime	  began	  falling	  
                                                
15	  Of	  course,	  there	  is	  crowding	  out	  on	  the	  margin:	  perhaps	  educational	  budgets	  
would	   have	   grown	   even	   faster	   had	   states	   spent	   less	   on	   corrections.	   But	   all	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in	  1991,	  spending	  on	  corrections	  simply	  maintained	  pace	  with	  growing	  
overall	   spending.	  Of	  course,	   that	   the	  percent	  of	   the	  budget	  given	  over	  
to	   corrections	   stayed	   flat—rather	   than	   fell—during	   a	   time	   of	   falling	  
crime	  is	  perhaps	  somewhat	  surprising,	  and	  it	  suggests	  that	  correctional	  
systems	   have	   been	   effective	   at	   staving	   off	   budget	   cuts.16	  Yet	   it	   seems	  
likely	  that	  many	  government	  agencies,	  not	   just	  departments	  of	  correc-­‐
tion,	  are	  able	  to	  fight	  off	  retrenchment	  in	  situations	  like	  these.	  
That	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  prison	  budgets	  remained	  fairly	  stable	  since	  
1991	  actually	  is	  not	  that	  surprising,	  since	  the	  Standard	  Story’s	  claim	  that	  
tough-­‐on-­‐crime	  policies	  face	  no	  meaningful	  opposition	  mischaracterizes	  
the	   nature	   of	   state	   budgetary	   politics.	   State	   budgets	   are	   much	   more	  
restricted	  than	  the	  federal	  budget,	  since	  states	  are	  often	  subject	  to	  bal-­‐
anced-­‐budget	  provisions	  (of	  varying	  degrees	  of	  effectiveness),	  must	  bor-­‐
row	  money	  at	  less	  favorable	  rates,	  and	  cannot	  print	  their	  own	  money.	  In	  
short,	   state	   budgeting	   is	   much	   more	   a	   zero-­‐sum	   game	   than	   federal	  
budgeting,	   creating	   clear	   antagonists	   to	   tough-­‐on-­‐crime	   policies:	   not	  
“soft	  on	  crime”	  groups,	  but	  schools,	  hospitals,	  departments	  of	  transpor-­‐
tation,	  and	  everyone	  else	  clamoring	  for	  a	  piece	  of	  a	  fixed	  pool	  of	  money.	  
Every	  dollar	  that	  goes	  to	  a	  prison	  doesn’t	  go	  to	  a	  school,	  and	  at	  the	  state	  
level,	  lobbies	  like	  the	  National	  Education	  Association	  are	  quite	  powerful.	  
In	   light	   of	   these	   political	   realities,	   we	   should	   be	   concerned	   that	   the	  
Standard	  Story	  overemphasizes	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  “crime	  is	  different.”	  
	  
Where	  Do	  We	  Go	  From	  Here?	  
	  
                                                
16	  New	  York	  State,	  for	  example,	  has	  seen	  its	  prison	  population	  drop	  steadily	  by	  
about	  1%	  per	  year	  for	  over	  a	  decade,	  yet	  until	  very	  recently	   it	  has	  had	  a	  hard	  
time	   closing	   prisons	   that	   are	   almost	   entirely	   empty	   now.	   See	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/nyregion/17about.html	   and	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/nyregion/closed-­‐new-­‐york-­‐prisons-­‐
prove-­‐hard-­‐to-­‐sell.html.	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It	   is	   relatively	   straight-­‐forward	   to	   summarize	   the	   Standard	   Story’s	  
core	  assertions:	  prison	  populations	  have	  been	  pushed	  up	  by	  a	  relatively	  
coherent	   and	  politically	  powerful	   criminal	   justice	   system	   that	  has	   cho-­‐
sen	  to	  target	  drug	  offenders	  and	  to	  rely	  on	  increasingly	  long	  sentences.	  
And	  while	   none	   of	   these	   claims	   is	   necessarily	  wrong,	   as	   shown	   above	  
each	   has	   profound	   weaknesses	   and,	   taken	   together,	   provide	   a	   highly	  
misleading	   account	   of	   prison	   growth.	   The	   path	   forward,	   however,	  
should	  be	  fairly	  clear	  as	  well.	  A	  few	  quick,	  representative	  suggestions:	  
	  
1.	   Focus	   less	   on	   drug	   inmates	   and	  more	   on	   violent	   and	   property	  
offenders.	  That	  a	  majority	  of	  prison	  growth	  since	  1980	  has	  come	  from	  
locking	  up	  violent	  offenders	  does	  not	  mean	  our	  prisons	  are	  overflowing	  
with	  murderers	  and	  arsonists:	  many	  of	  these	  violent	  offenders	  may	  be	  
guilty	  of	  low-­‐level	  acts	  of	  violence	  that	  would	  have	  resulted	  in	  probation	  
ten	   or	   fifteen	   years	   ago,	   and	  who	  may	   not	   pose	   serious	   public	   safety	  
risks.	   But	   the	   politics	   of	   dialing	   back	   enforcement	   against	   violent	   of-­‐
fenders	  is	  qualitatively	  different	  than	  that	  looking	  at	  drug	  offenders.	  
	  
2.	   Focus	   less	   on	   sentence	   length	   and	  more	   on	   admissions.	   At	   one	  
level,	   the	   distinction	   here	   may	   be	   slight:	   any	   new	   admission	   can	   be	  
thought	   of	   as	   raising	   the	   time	   served	   from	   zero	   to	   non-­‐zero.	   A	   new	  
mandatory	  minimum	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  both	  a	   time	  served-­‐side	  and	  an	  
admission-­‐side	   policy.	   That	   said,	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   our	   attention	  
should	  be	  on	  figuring	  out	  what	   is	  driving	  up	  felony	  filings	  and	  thus	  ad-­‐
missions:	   is	   this	   simply	  a	  change	   in	  prosecutorial	  attitudes;	   is	   it	  due	   to	  
(short)	  mandatory	  minimums	  denying	  probation	  to	  defendants	  without	  
making	   them	   serve	   much	   time;	   is	   it	   that	   prosecutors	   use	   massively	  
longer	  sentences	  as	  effective	  hammers	  to	  bang	  out	  pleas;	  or	  something	  
else?	  
	  
3.	   Develop	  richer	  institutional	  accounts.	  It	  seems	  likely	  that	  prison	  
growth	   is	   less	   the	  product	   of	   some	   coherent	   plan	   and	  more	   the	  unin-­‐
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tended	  result	  of	  actions	  taken	  by	  numerous,	  relatively	  autonomous	  bu-­‐
reaucracies,	  many	  situated	   in	   relatively	   small	  geographic	  areas	  such	  as	  
cities	   and	   counties	   (which	   should	   only	   emphasize	   the	   uncoordinated	  
nature	  of	  growth).	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  explain	  how	  growth	  has	  occurred—
and	   thus	   how	   to	   adjust	   it—without	   understanding	   the	   interaction	   of	  
various	   agencies’	   decisions.	  Unfortunately,	  we	  have	   very	   little	   data	  on	  
these	  interactions	  yet	  at	  this	  point,	  since	  widespread	  adherence	  to	  the	  
Standard	   Story	   has	   caused	  most	   social	   scientists	   to	   design	   only	   state-­‐	  
and	  federal-­‐level	  models.	  
	  
Reforming	  penal	  practices	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  impossible	  without	  
a	  solid,	  rigorous	  understanding	  of	  the	  key	  forces	  at	  play.	  Unfortunately,	  
we	  are	  currently	  saddled	  with	  a	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  is	  truly	  inad-­‐
equate.	  Hopefully	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  move	  beyond	  it	  before	  the	  oppor-­‐
tunity	  for	  meaningful	  reform	  passes.	  
	  
